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BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the Utah Const, art. VIII, S 3, and Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee, H. Glenn Olson, disagrees with the Appellants' 
statement of the issues presented for review in the following 
respects. The matters presented as issue nos. 1 and 2 (discussed 
in Appellants' Brief at Points I and II) were not raised in the 
district court; therefore, the issues may not be considered by 
this Court on appeal. See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987), and Argument at Point I. 
Hence, the only issues properly presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Park's counter-
claim on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted? 
In reviewing the trial court's order, the Court considers 
the material allegations of the counterclaim as true, and will 
affirm a dismissal for failure to state a claim only if it 
appears that the claimant can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim. Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 132 Utah Adv. Rpt. 3 
(Utah 1990) . 
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2. Did the trial court err in awarding Olson his attor-
neys* fees incurred in connection with the claims for indemnity 
against Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. ("PCO")? 
As the issue presented does not involve the amount of 
attorneys' fees awarded, but merely the propriety of any award of 
attorneys' fees, the issue is a question of law which the court 
reviews for correctness. See Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Olson believes Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415 (1953, as 
amended), is determinative of the attorneys' fee issue. Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-3-415 states, in pertinent part: 
(1) An accommodation party is one who signs the 
instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending 
his name to another party to it. 
• * • 
(5) An accommodation party is not liable to the party 
accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a right 
of recourse on the instrument against such party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Disposition Below. 
Olson filed his complaint seeking indemnity from PCO and 
contribution from J. Samuel Park ("Park") and Ellis Edward Craig 
("Craig") for amounts Olson paid to First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. (the "Bank"), on a judgment rendered in favor of the Bank on 
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certain notes. The notes were executed by PCO. Olson, Park and 
Craig had each executed a guaranty to the Bank of PCO's debts. 
During the course of proceedings below, summary judgment was 
granted in favor of Olson against Craig for the amount demanded. 
R. 528-30. Craig has taken no appeal from the judgment. 
Shortly after PCO and Park filed their answer, Olson filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment against PCO and Park. R. 92-94. The 
Motion for Summary Judgment was denied without prejudice to its 
renewal, and, in the same order, the trial court granted leave to 
PCO and Park to file counterclaims and established a deadline for 
completing discovery with respect to alleged setoff claims that 
could be asserted by PCO and Park against Olson. R. 388-91. 
Thereafter, and within the time allowed by the court, Park 
(but not PCO) filed a counterclaim. R. 397-414. Shortly after 
filing of the counterclaim, Olson renewed his motion for summary 
judgment against Park and PCO, and filed a motion to dismiss the 
counterclaim of Park for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. R. 417-19, 432-33. The district court 
granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss Park's counterclaim and the 
renewed motion for summary judgment. R. 592-94, 615-18. Prior 
to entry of the Summary Judgment, PCO and Park objected to the 
proposed award of attorneys' fees as against PCO, which objection 
was overruled by the Court. R. 612-14. Park and PCO then filed 
their notice of appeal. 
-3-
B. Statement of Facts. 
Although Olson generally agrees with the statement of facts 
set forth by Park and PCO, several items require clarification. 
When Park paid $235,000 to the Bank, he obtained a release of 
Park, PCO and Craig from any liability on any obligations to the 
Bank, including the notes upon which the Bank had obtained a 
judgment against Olson (although the Bank's claims against Olson 
were reserved). R. 249 (Aff. of Park, H 13). Park's payments to 
the Bank were later fully reimbursed by PCO in connection with the 
sale of PCO's assets to Marie Callender Ventures, Inc., in June of 
1988. R. 405-06, 414. Thus, when Olson's Complaint was filed in 
February of 1989, Park had not paid any money to the Bank on 
account of his guaranty that had not been reimbursed by PCO, the 
principal obligor. R. 249-50 (Aff. of Park, f 14). Further, 
except to the extent Olson is entitled to enforce the Bank's notes 
under principles of subrogation, the Bank was not owed any money 
when plaintiff's complaint was filed, having released its claims 
as against Park, Craig, and PCO, and having satisfied the judgment 
as against Olson. R. 133-34 248-49, 257-70. 
Park's counterclaim asserts an entitlement to recover 16.67% 
(being Olson's proportionate ownership of PCO) of the following 
sums: 
(1) $4,374.73 in general advances by Park to PCO that 
had not been reimbursed; 
(2) $2,981.50 in accounting fees paid to David Pelton; 
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(3) $33,050.89 in attorneys1 fees paid to Suitter 
Axland Armstrong & Hanson; 
(4) $320.25 in printing expenses for PCO employee W-2 
forms; 
(5) $765 in storage costs; and 
(6) $225,000 as the value of Park's personal services 
in negotiating releases of Olson and others on 
jointly-guaranteed leasehold and franchise obli-
gations of PCO. 
R. 405-10 (1M 16, 17, 18, 19 and 21). Each of the cash advances 
was alleged to be to or for the benefit of PCO. R. 405-06. The 
advance of $4,374.73 was made before July 31, 1988, but all other 
advances were made after that date. 16. Park's counterclaim 
does not allege that he paid any money on any jointly-guaranteed 
obligations, except the $235,000 paid on the Bank's notes (which 
was completely reimbursed by PCO). R. 404-09 (ff 15, 17, 18 and 
19). Instead, the counterclaim alleges that each of Olson's 
guaranties (except to the Bank) was released, or the underlying 
obligations cancelled or terminated, without payment by Park. R. 
406-09 (fit 17 and 18) . 
Each of the advances by Park to PCO, for which he seeks 
partial reimbursement from Olson, and Park's actions in nego-
tiating and obtaining releases, directly or indirectly benefitted 
Park. R. 240-318 (Aff. of Park), 397-414 (Park's Counterclaim). 
Park's counterclaim makes no allegation that any of the services 
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performed by Park were requested by Olson, or that Olson made any 
statement or did any act that led Park to believe he would be 
compensated by Olson for his services. R. 397-414 • In fact, 
Park alleged in the trial court that he was unable to obtain the 
cooperation or participation of Olson in negotiating with 
creditors. R. 248, 405. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The bulk of the Appellants' arguments on appeal were not 
presented to the trial court; therefore, the issues may not be 
considered on appeal. Even if considered on the merits, 
Appellants' argument that Olson is not entitled to contribution 
is without merit, since based upon the mistaken notion that 
reimbursement of Park by PCO, the principal obligor, should be 
disregarded. 
Park's counterclaim was properly dismissed for failure to 
state a claim, since Park can establish no set of facts that 
would prove that Olson appreciated and knew of a benefit 
allegedly conferred by Park, or that the benefit was conferred 
under circumstances that would render it unjust for Olson to 
retain the benefit without paying Park. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415, and general principles of 
suretyship, Olson was entitled to an award of his attorneys' fees 
incurred in defending the Bank's lawsuit and in pursuing indem-




ARGUMENTS RAISED BY APPELLANTS FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED. 
A basic tenet of appellate review is that, generally 
speaking, issues and defenses not presented to the trial court 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Banaerter v. 
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). A litigant may not complain 
of error by the trial court if that court was not presented the 
opportunity to err. Consistent with this principle, numerous 
defenses raised by Park and PCO for the first time in this appeal 
should not be considered in determining the correctness of the 
trial court's orders and judgment. 
Although the trial court proceedings in this matter were 
concluded without undue delay, there is no question but that the 
parties were given a full and fair opportunity to present all 
issues and defenses to the district court judge. Numerous memo-
randa, objections, affidavits, and other pleadings were presented 
to the trial court for consideration in resolving the various 
motions. Notwithstanding the opportunity to present whatever 
issues and defenses they wished the trial court to consider, PCO 
and Park failed to raise the following arguments (referenced by 
the portion of Appellants' Brief in which the argument is raised) 
now urged as grounds for reversal: 
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POINT I.A.: That Park was not liable for contribution 
because he paid more than his proportionate share of 
PCO's debt to the Bank, the fact that Park was reim-
bursed by PCO being irrelevant. 
POINT I.B.: That Olson did not pay more than his 
proportionate share of the Bank's claims, since the 
guarantors should share equally in discharging the 
obligations and Olson did not pay more than one-third 
of the total debt (the "total debt" being calculated 
without regard to PCO's reimbursement of Park), 
POINT II: That the amount of Park's liability was 
incorrectly calculated, since Olson's proportionate 
share should be based upon the total owed to the Bank 
(which Park alleges was approximately $320,000), with-
out regard to PCO's reimbursement of Park. 
POINT IV: That no attorneys' fees should be awarded 
plaintiff because there was no evidence that Olson 
became a surety with the consent of PCO. 
None of the foregoing arguments was urged as a defense or an 
issue in the trial court by Park or PCO. The only one of these 
issues even adverted to in the district court was the notion that 
co-guarantors of a corporate debt should share liability on their 
guaranties in the same proportion as their stock ownership. That 
legal position was pled in Olson's complaint and was urged in 
support of Olson's motion for summary judgment against Park and 
Craig. Neither defendant contested the argument below; contrari-
wise, Park's counterclaim urged that the court should award reim-
bursement of Park's claimed expenses on the same basis (Olson's 
percentage ownership of PCO). Thus, not only did Park fail to 
make it an issue for resolution by the court, he adopted the 
legal position as his own in pleading the counterclaim. 
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As the Court noted in Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987), the record on 
appeal must demonstrate that an argument has been presented to 
the trial court in such a fashion that a ruling has been obtained 
thereon. Nothing in the record demonstrates that these arguments 
were presented to the trial court; therefore, neither Park nor 
PCO may claim the trial court erred in rejecting them. 
POINT II 
PARK'S COUNTERCLAIM FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM 
UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. 
On appeal, Park argues that his counterclaim sets forth 
facts that establish a claim for relief on a quasi-contract or 
unjust enrichment theory. Park argues that if one accepts the 
material allegations of the counterclaim as true, construes the 
counterclaim in the light most favorable to Park, and draws all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the counterclaimant, then Park 
has pled a right to relief under a contract implied in law. 
However, the counterclaim fails to afford a basis upon which 
relief can be granted, since it fails to allege facts which, even 
liberally interpreted, would support a cause of action for unjust 
enrichment. 
In Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the 
court reviewed the law concerning quantum meruit claims. The 
court noted that quantum meruit claims may be either contracts 
implied in law, such as quasi-contract or unjust enrichment 
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claims, or contracts implied in fact (a contract established by 
conduct of the parties). In either case, however, the claim is 
recognized by the courts in order to prevent a party's enrichment 
at another's expense, id. at 269. 
Park admits that the counterclaim does not allege any con-
tract implied in fact, but instead asserts that a quasi-contract 
or unjust enrichment claim is pled. As the Davies opinion 
explained: 
The elements of a quasi-contract, or a contract implied 
in law, are: (1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) 
an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the 
benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make it 
unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
paying for it. 
Id. at 269. Even a charitable interpretation of Park's asser-
tions does not establish the final two elements of a quasi-
contract claim. 
Park alleges that a benefit was conferred upon Olson, thus 
satisfying the first element of the test. Because Park alleges 
in the counterclaim that he secured releases of Olson's guaran-
ties by his personal efforts, and not as PCO's president or by 
the use of PCO's assets, the allegation that a benefit was 
conferred is presumed true at this stage.1 That Park was the 
majority shareholder and in control of PCO, that his efforts 
Mark's counterclaim also sought reimbursement for 16.67% of 
certain cash advances by Park to PCO. R. 405-06. It appears 
these claims have been abandoned on appeal. As none of the cash 
advances was used to pay jointly guaranteed debts, no claim for 
relief was stated. 
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resulted in a discharge of his own indebtedness, and that PCO's 
assets were sold in the transaction that secured the releases, 
will not, at this stage, defeat Park's assertion that Olson 
received a benefit; however, such facts must be considered in 
determining whether the other two elements of the cause of action 
can be proved. 
Textbook examples of contract implied in law include money 
paid by mistake, and where a claimant paints a house by mistake 
with the owner standing by and watching the claimant's efforts* 
In these textbook examples, the person against whom the claim is 
lodged both appreciated and had knowledge of the benefit under 
circumstances that would make it unjust to allow the benefit to 
be retained without paying for it. No allegation of the counter-
claim, either specifically or generally, supports a finding that 
Olson appreciated and knew of the benefit of his releases from 
guaranties under circumstances that would make it unjust for him 
to retain the benefit. 
Park alleges that Olson knew Park was attempting to negoti-
ate compromises with creditors, a sale of PCO's assets, and a 
release of their guaranty obligations, but that Olson refused to 
participate or assist in Park's efforts. Park also alleges that 
Olson knew, from being furnished a draft of the proposed asset 
sale to Marie Callender Ventures, Inc., that as a result of the 
sale Olson would be released from his personal guaranties. Park 
claims that from those facts, one may infer that Olson had an 
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appreciation or knowledge of a benefit being furnished by Park. 
While it may be appropriate to infer that Olson had knowledge he 
was being released from guaranties, it is an unjustified leap of 
faith, and not a reasonable inference, to conclude that Olson 
appreciated that the benefit was being conferred by Park, rather 
than by PCO as the principal obligor. 
Related to this issue is whether the counterclaim alleges 
circumstances that would make it unjust to permit Olson to retain 
the benefit of his releases without payment. Park claims that 
this element is satisfied by reference to two allegations: (1) 
that Olson received a benefit; and (2) that Park requested Olson 
to assist, either financially or personally, in negotiations with 
creditors. It is, once again, a leap of faith, and not a reason-
able inference, to conclude from these allegations that it would 
be unjust for Olson to retain the benefit without paying for it. 
In Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 
P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977), the court stated: 
The mere fact that a third person benefits from a 
contract between two others does not make such third 
person liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or 
restitution. See 66 Am. Jur.2d 960. There must be 
some misleading act, request for services, or the like, 
to support such an action. Mere failure of performance 
by one of the contracting parties does not give rise to 
a right of restitution. 
The court1s holding is consistent with the Restatement of 
Restitution § 112 (1937): 
A person who without mistake, coercion or request has 
unconditionally conferred a benefit upon another is not 
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entitled to restitution, except where the benefit was 
conferred under circumstances making such action 
necessary for the protection of the interests of the 
other or of third persons. 
In Park's counterclaim, there is no allegation of any misleading 
act, request for services, or any other action by or duty of 
Olson that would make it unjust for Olson to retain the benefit 
of his releases without paying Park. To the contrary, the alle-
gations of the counterclaim demonstrate that Park was, by his own 
efforts, personally released from contingent liabilities appar-
ently in excess of Olson's. R. 402-03, 405-09. Park's services 
would have been furnished in any event, as Park was clearly 
motivated by his own interests.2 
This court has repeatedly held that services performed by a 
party for his own advantage, and from which the defendant bene-
fits incidentally, are not recoverable. See Bauqh v. Parley, 184 
P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947); Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 209 
(Utah 1976); Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557-58 (Utah 
1984). The court has not used the term "incidental" as a synonym 
for inconsequential, but as descriptive of benefits resulting as 
a byproduct of a person's actions. 
2Sparks v. Gustafson, 750 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1988), is 
distinguishable on this point. In Sparks, the claimant managed 
the business of another in which he had no ownership. The 
appeals court upheld the trial court's determination that the 
services performed were of a nature usually compensated, and not 
offered gratuitously. 
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In Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d at 209, the Court posed the 
issue as follows: "Under these circumstances, did the defendant 
have a duty to pay plaintiff that the law will impute to him a 
promise to fulfill that obligation?" Under no set of facts that 
may be proved by Park, or reasonably inferred from the counter-
claim, did Olson have a "duty" to pay Park, such that the law 
will imply a promise and a remedy. Dismissal of the counterclaim 
was therefore appropriate. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST 
PCO WAS APPROPRIATE. 
The trial court awarded to Olson $1,310.50 incurred in con-
nection with the Bank's lawsuit. The court further awarded Olson 
the sum of $2,500 against PCO for attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this lawsuit. PCO disputes the awards of attorneys' 
fees, claiming that Olson was only entitled to reimbursement of 
the payment made on PCO's debt to the Bank, since he failed to 
show he was a surety at the request of or with the consent of 
PCO, and further that attorneys' fees in this action were not 
awardable because there is no statute or contract so providing. 
PCO is in error. 
First, as noted above, the argument regarding the award of 
attorneys' fees incurred in the First Security Bank lawsuit was 
not raised below and has therefore been waived. Further, under 
the circumstances of this case, it can hardly be argued that PCO 
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did not know and agree to Olson's becoming a surety. Thus, the 
argument is not well taken on the merits. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415 allows Olson to recover attor-
neys' fees incurred in this action as against PCO, since he is 
entitled to enforce the instruments he has paid. In Kennedy v. 
Bank of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 884 (Utah 1979), the court speci-
fically held that a person signing a letter of guaranty was an 
accommodation party as that term is used in § 70A-3-415. In 
Murray v. Payne, 437 So.2d 47 (Miss. 1983), the court interpreted 
the statute similarly, holding that because guarantors are sure-
ties they are also accommodation parties under U.C.C. § 3-415. 
Under § 70A-3-415(5), an accommodation party that pays the 
instrument has a right a recourse on the instrument against the 
accommodated party (in this case, PCO). Since the Bank's notes 
provided for an award of attorneys' fees, attorneys' fees should 
likewise be awarded to Olson. Further, as Official Comment 5 to 
U.C.C. § 3-415 notes, an accommodation party is subrogated to the 
rights of the holder under general principles of suretyship. The 
court's award of attorneys' fees was therefore correct. 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PARK ON THE 
CONTRIBUTION CLAIM WAS PROPER. 
As noted in Point I, supra. Park's arguments regarding the 
correctness of the trial court's award of contribution against 
Park are raised for the first time in this appeal and, therefore, 
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should not be considered. In addition, the arguments are without 
merit. 
Park argues that the court's summary judgment was improper 
because Park's payment of $235,000 was in excess of his propor-
tionate share of the obligation (Appellants' Point I.A.), and 
that Olson never paid in excess of his proportionate share 
(Appellants' Point II.). These arguments are based upon the 
mistaken notion that PCO's reimbursement of the $235,000 paid by 
Park should be disregarded. There is no basis in the law for 
ignoring the fact that PCO honored its indemnity obligation to 
its controlling shareholder.3 At the time Olson brought his 
Complaint, Park had been fully reimbursed by PCO, PCO had no 
further obligation to the Bank, and Olson was the only guarantor 
who had paid any sums not yet reimbursed. 
The rule of law suggested by Park's argument is nonsensical 
and unfair. It would permit a controlling shareholder and co-
guarantor to escape liability for contribution by causing the 
corporation to reimburse any advances made by the controlling 
shareholder on the guaranty. Thus, by unfair manipulation of the 
3The authorities apparently relied upon by Park on this 
point (Restatement of Restitution § 85 (1937) and Restatement of 
Security § 154(4) (1941)) are specifically limited to reimburse-
ment by the principal obligor after a final settlement between 
cosureties. Restatement of Security § 154, comment (e) (1941), 
notes, "The amount of the proportionate shares for which 
cosureties are liable among themselves is affected by the extent 
to which the principal himself performs. This is true whether 
the principal's partial performance is before or after the 
surety's performance." 
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corporation's finances, the controlling shareholder would, under 
Park's theory, escape any liability on his guaranty, notwith-
standing the fact that the creditor has been paid in full and one 
or more other co-guarantors have not been reimbursed. This 
argument simply does not make any sense, and no authority is 
cited for the proposition. 
Park also argues, for the first time on appeal, that Park, 
Craig and Olson should share liability equally, notwithstanding 
their disparate ownership of stock of PCO. Although there is a 
split of authority on this issue (and apparently no Utah prece-
dent), a division of liability based upon proportionate ownership 
in an enterprise is the better rule of law. 
Typically, the cases holding that liability for contribution 
should be determined without regard to unequal ownership in an 
enterprise simply apply a presumption that liability is to be 
shared equally. As Park recognizes, however, there is an 
exception to the general rule of equal contribution if the co-
guarantors have received unequal benefits. Should the court 
choose to address it, the issue is therefore whether the presump-
tion should be that co-guarantors of a corporate debt have 
impliedly agreed to share liability in proportion to their stock 
ownership, or equally. The issue is not whether an immutable 
rule should be established, but whether in the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary, a common liability of shareholders/ 
sureties should be shared in proportion to stock ownership. 
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The search is for a legal presumption that will apply in 
most instances. The search should, therefore, begin with an 
examination of the cause of action asserted, that being a claim 
for contribution. Generally speaking, a right to contribution is 
a contract, implied between co-guarantors, that liability on a 
common debt will be shared. As Park recognizes, if co-
guarantors receive unequal benefits from the common obligation, 
then contribution will be ordered based upon the proportionate 
benefits. Where, as in this case, the co-guarantors' interests 
in the principal obligor are not equal, the court should presume, 
in the absence of contrary evidence, that the benefit was simi-
larly unequal. See Bossard v. Sullivan, 670 P.2d 1389 (Mont. 
1983). Considering only unequal ownership of a corporate obligor 
by co-guarantors, the promise that should be implied is a sharing 
of liability in proportion to stock ownership, because the bene-
fits from the obligation are proportionate to stock ownership. 
In Brown v. Goldsmith, 437 P.2d 247, 248 (Okla. 1968), the 
court held that contribution should be based upon proportionate 
ownership of stock, and reasoned: 
In the present case, the purpose of the loan guaranty 
agreement was to enable the corporation to conduct and 
operate its business at a profit for the benefit of the 
stockholders. The money from the indebtedness was 
received and used by the corporation. The indebtedness 
was incurred for the use and benefit of the corpora-
tion, who was the primary obligor. If this indebted-
ness had resulted in a profit for the corporation, the 
defendant would have received this benefit in propor-
tion to the extent of his stock ownership in the 
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company. Assuming also, if the corporation could have 
repaid the indebtedness, the value of defendant's stock 
would have been reduced proportionately. We see no 
reason to apply a different rule for the losses 
incurred by the co-obligors under their agreement. It 
is only equitable that the burden of the obligation be 
borne by the defendant in proportion to the amount of 
his ownership of stock in the corporation. 
See also Restatement of Restitution § 85, comment (f) (1937). 
While circumstances can be imagined that would result in equal 
benefits to co-guarantors with unequal stock ownership, such 
circumstances would be relatively unusual. The better presump-
tion is, therefore, that co-guarantors of a corporate debt have 
impliedly agreed to share the debt in the proportions of their 
stock ownership at the time the guaranties are executed, since 
the guarantors would expect to benefit in the same proportions. 
In the event the court considers this issue, it should adopt this 
general rule. Thus, on the basis of the record establishing the 
respective stock ownerships, the trial court's judgment was 
proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The orders and judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed, and the matter remanded for a determination of 
attorneys1 fees to be awarded Olson against PCO in connection 
with this appeal. 
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